The Digital Networks Act (DNA) should protect privacy, combat fraud while preserving legitimate telemarketing

FEDMA welcomes the Digital Networks Act proposal, particularly the objective of simplifying and further harmonising the legal telecommunications framework to strengthen the internal market.
However, the transfer of some ePrivacy Directive provisions to the Digital Network Act (DNA) risks leading to (unintended) spillover effects, legal inconsistencies and uncertainty, which will negatively impact the internal market and economic growth for European businesses, particularly SMEs. It will also limit fundraising and other activities of Civil Society Organisations (e.g. consumer organisations, NGOs and charities). While the objectives of the DNA are most welcome, certain policy solutions proposed in the DNA have not been proven effective for consumer protection or personal data protection.
Consumers deserve protection from fraud and unwanted calls.
Yet the DNA unfairly links opt-out directory models to fraud risks, even though there is no evidence that such models make consumers more vulnerable. At the same time, moving towards a consent-only approach for directory inclusion could significantly reduce the availability of contact information widely used by businesses, charities and NGOs for legitimate outreach, fundraising and customer engagement.
Moreover, if the DNA does not clearly define what a "nuisance call" is, there is a risk that legitimate communications from businesses, charities and community organisations could be caught by rules that were never intended to target them. This lack of definition also will create different interpretations by enforcers across Member States.
Public directories continue to serve an important role.
Phone directories exist to help people find and contact one another, e.g. reaching a potential new business partner. Yet the current wording of the DNA risks creating legal uncertainty that could undermine these useful tools without delivering clear benefits for privacy.
Fraud should be tackled by proven policy initiatives rather than assumptions.
The protection of consumers against fraud should be based on measures that were proven efficient against fraud, rather than on assumptions. Fraudsters typically rely on caller ID spoofing and deceptive communications. The DNA should therefore prioritise effective anti-fraud tools such as caller authentication and anti-spoofing technologies. To prevent fraud, we should target fraudsters, not the organisations that follow the rules.
Given the above, FEDMA’s recommends:
- Introducing a dedicated operative provision on publicly available directories (Article 107a) following an opt-out model.
- Amending recital 307 to ensure that it fulfils its interpretative function, uses precise terminology which accurately reflects operational realities and the purpose of publicly available directories. Substantive obligations should also be left to operative text.
- Clarify the concept of "nuisance calls" through a dedicated definition in the DNA.
- Address fraud risks through proven caller-authentication, anti-spoofing and caller-verification measures rather than restrictions on directory inclusion and telemarketing.

